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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a thoughtful rejoinder to a series of comments on the blog The Immanent Frame, 
Abdullahi An-Na’im resorts to a peculiar strategy to defend the main substantive 
argument of his magisterial study Islam and the Secular State (2008b). Faced with 
objections regarding his use of concepts such as “secularism” or “civic reason”, An-
Na’im drily, and only half-seriously, responds:  
I don’t mean to offend theorists in this field, but I wish I could communicate 
what I mean without ever using terms like secularism and liberalism because 
they tend to distract rather than facilitate understanding. As I briefly explained in 
Islam and the Secular State, I hesitated in using the term secularism because of 
its negative associations among Muslims in particular. […] Since the use of this 
term is usually the only point of contention whenever I present my proposal to 
Muslims, I often suggest: “let us call it X, and focus on what I mean.” The same 
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is true about liberalism, though it is not as notorious among Muslims as 
secularism. (An-Na’im 2008a) 
This desire to resolve, defuse or circumvent controversies around the precise meanings 
of terms by pragmatically resorting to the “empty signifier” X is understandable.1 As 
any member of the academic community probably knows from personal experience, the 
most vehement disputes in this community frequently deteriorate into endless rounds of 
terminological hairsplitting, sometimes without any consequence whatsoever for the 
real world.2 All too often obsessive nitpicking over minor conceptual distinctions sadly 
clouds the debate about substantive arguments. 
While it is tempting to sympathize with An-Na’im for trying to steer our attention to the 
issues he wants to discuss, his appeal to “call it X” also raises some doubts as to its 
political implications. For it is certainly true that words matter, that the concepts we use 
in political discourse shape the deliberative space within which civic conversations take 
place. What is more, legal language cannot, in the long run, be sustained by the 
inconsistent or arbitrary use of concepts. Therefore, it seems overly optimistic to believe 
that An-Na’im’s proposal to substitute a highly controversial term with the innocent 
cipher “X” will ease over the complications. And it is complications we encounter when 
quickly reviewing the recent debate about political secularism. Given the extensive 
criticism of the long-held assumption that secularization (however defined) goes hand in 
hand with modernization (Casanova 2006; Turner 2011), the debate around secularism 
(and its discontents)3 is today profoundly separated in two camps: between those who 
wish to abandon the language of secularism altogether, and those who wish to refine 
that very language such that it becomes more attuned to the complex reality of 
contemporary societies around the globe.4 
In search of a common denominator, the first camp – let us for brevity’s sake call them 
“abolitionists” – may write on its banner the telling title of Veit Bader’s book 
Secularism or Democracy? (2007). Encapsulated in this rhetorically suggestive 
opposition we can clearly see the basic claim defended by those who seek to overcome 
the normative and explanatory language of secularism altogether. (Bader 2010; 
Connolly 1999) Secularism, on this account, poses a serious impediment to the 
flourishing of (liberal) democracies, whose defense is best provided by a robust 
3 
 
constitutionalism. Thus, we would be well advised to refrain from, and indeed abolish, 
any reference to secularism in our legal and political language. 
The second camp, let us call its members “redescriptivists”, is rather more difficult to 
unite under a single banner. Perhaps Rajeev Bhargava’s plea for “alternative 
conceptions” of secularism serves the purpose best: his work is exemplary of most 
attempts to re-articulate secularism insofar as it envisages global comparisons of secular 
regimes as productive resources for developing new varieties of secularism. (Bhargava 
2006, 2008, 2011) Drawing Euro- and North-centric eyes to the illustrative case of 
Indian secularism, he engages in a theoretical act of “redescription” (Rorty 1989:90). 
On this account, what we need is a novel narrative of secularism – new norms, stories, 
and ideologies – that liberates us from the restrictive and limited account developed in 
classical secularization theories.5 Instead of giving up on the concept of secularism 
altogether, the adherents to this camp work towards more convincing and sensible 
articulations thereof. 
The purpose of this paper is to intervene in the debate between “abolitionists” and 
“redescriptivists” by charting the conceptual and normative territory on which both 
camps stand. Although “abolitionists” and “redescriptivists” disagree on a number of 
important questions, they also subscribe to several assumptions that unite them in their 
disagreement. For example, both camps express a profound dissatisfaction with the 
traditional equation of secularization with modernization. Another point of consensus 
between “abolitionists” and “redescriptivists” concerns their critical attitude towards the 
Western bias many narrations of secularism exhibit. However, while I am convinced 
that this would be a worthwhile endeavor, I will not try to settle the dispute around the 
use of the word “secularism” by showing the extent to which “abolitionists” and 
“redescriptivists” simply agree to disagree. Rather, I will try to achieve two goals: (1) 
uncover three ways in which normative theories of secularism may relate to real world 
contexts; and (2) distinguish three meta-narratives that structure debates in 
contemporary societies. In what follows, I mainly focus on the “redescriptivist” camp, 
whose objective it is to salvage the notion of secularism. The paper, hence, hopes to 
contribute to a better understanding of the discursive options available in the ongoing 
controversy, but it does not aim at outlining the debate in its full complexity. For a more 
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comprehensive account it would be indispensable to also scrutinize and probe the 
claims of the “abolitionist” camp, which will not be possible here. (Bader 2003, 2009) 
II. NORMS AND CONTEXTS: THREE WAYS OF RELATING THEM 
One of the reasons why the debate on the place of religion in the public sphere remains 
so vivid is that it taps into a more comprehensive set of methodological issues in 
political philosophy today. This interest was triggered by what Hilary Putnam has called 
the “collapse of the fact/value dichotomy”. (Putnam 2002) Political philosophers have 
absorbed this collapse rather late, in the slightly disguised form of a discussion about 
the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory. (Farrelly 2007; Valentini 2009; 
Wiens 2012) This discussion directly bears upon the controversy around secularism 
because it is crucially concerned with the question how norms and contexts ought to 
relate to each other.6 This is, of course, one of the social sciences’ fundamental riddles, 
which at least dates back to the birth pangs of modern academic disciplines. But in 
political philosophy, and with regard to secularism, the question has lead principally to 
three kinds of responses: (1) an idealizing approach that seeks to focus solely on the 
normative dimension of secularism, without paying particular attention to the context; 
(2) a reconstructive approach that attempts to extract from the context the governing 
norms of secularism; and (3) a dialectical approach that conceives of norms and 
contexts as implicating and influencing each other. I will now quickly rehearse each of 
these approaches. Before that, however, a caveat seems indispensable. As will soon 
become obvious, this tripartite distinction is ideal-typical: I do not wish to claim that all 
positions in the current debate fit neatly into one, or only one category. Further, there 
are many borderline cases that challenge the proposed taxonomy. However, the 
distinction itself can assist us in organizing the apparently cacophonous debate.7 
(1) The first answer tries to keep norms and contexts as much apart as possible.8 Here, 
we find a deep concern with analyzing and constructing the morality of separating 
religion and politics. This concern if often raised in concrete cases that challenge 
traditional arrangements. Take, for example, some of the philosophically minded 
discussions of the headscarf issue in France. More often than not, the headscarf issue is 
debated in terms of a general challenge for liberal modes of toleration. Thus, little 
attention is paid to the historical and social context within which the issue itself could 
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become so controversial. Instead, the focus lies on exploring, with as much precision as 
possible, the ways in which policies in the real world fail to live up to the high ideals of 
toleration and justice. Authors who pursue this approach normally aim at transcending 
the context where norms are detected; at the same time they use the context as an 
occasion to test the applicability of universal and abstract norms, such as toleration and 
justice for example.9 
(2) The second response starts from the opposite premises. Here, the assumption is that 
norms and contexts can never be neatly separated. Rather, norms are always embedded, 
and indeed conditioned and restricted by the context within which they are invoked. On 
this account, norms are always relative to the context. Therefore, it does not make sense 
to investigate a public controversy, such as the one surrounding the headscarf, in 
abstract or universalistic terms. What is instead needed, is an explanatory and 
reconstructive approach to secularism that takes the empirical reality seriously.10 The 
normative dimension is subordinated in favor of a more anthropological engagement 
with the context. Proponents of this approach often are skeptical of any attempt to 
disentangle norms from contexts for they fear that such an operation would jettison the 
critical verve with which they analyze the controversy. 
(3) The third response sits somewhat uneasily between the first two approaches. Here, 
the relationship between contexts and norms is conceptualized in such a way that they 
are mutually constitutive. Contexts, on this account, generate norms, and norms 
generate contexts. Methodologically, this implies that the normative dimension of a 
public controversy cannot be fully explored without also paying close attention to the 
context within which it could arise.11 What distinguishes this approach from the second 
one is that it has a strong interest in the normative dimension of the controversy, and 
usually aims at offering some tentative solutions to pressing problems of 
accommodation, for example. But usually the suggested solutions are closely attuned to 
the context, and thus less universalistic and abstract than in the idealizing approach. 
The idealizing, reconstructive and dialectical approaches to secularism tell us different 
stories about the relationship between religion and politics. They are premised on 
various foundational assumptions about how norms and contexts ought to be 
understood. Accordingly, their general outlook on public controversies differs 
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significantly. While the idealizing approach usually stays at some distance to the 
intricacies of public controversies, the reconstructive approach first and foremost seeks 
to further our understanding of the power structures of the particular context. The 
dialectical approach tries to bridge the gap between the other two approaches by 
offering a contextually sensitive and normatively plausible assessment of public 
controversies. Let us now leave these methodological reflections to turn to more 
substantive discussions. 
III. VARIETIES OF SECULAR FORMATIONS: COERCIVE, SEGREGATIONIST 
AND ACCOMMODATIVE 
The three meta-narratives I now want to introduce can be found in several comparative 
studies of secular regimes. As meta-narratives they merely highlight family 
resemblances that cut across otherwise highly differentiated policy regimes. Therefore, 
it must be emphasized at the beginning of this section that it is not the purpose of these 
meta-narratives to somehow essentialize the complex and shifting boundaries between 
religion and politics, as if there were just a few ways of configuring them. As recent 
research on the global scale has made it abundantly clear, the traditional metaphor of a 
simple and unmovable “wall of separation” between religion and politics is rather 
misleading a characterization of secularism. Instead of drawing on this metaphor, I will 
therefore make use of a more flexible conceptual framework proposed by Jocelyn 
Maclure and Charles Taylor. This framework has the advantage of emphasizing the 
conflictual core of secularism, by showing that several principles are involved in its 
defense, principles that do not always interact harmoniously. 
In their recent book (2011), Maclure and Taylor insist that we clearly distinguish 
between two kinds of principles underlying political secularism – that is secularism as a 
mode of governing the relations between the political and the religious sphere: (1) 
foundational principles that justify the duty to establish a secular regime; and (2) 
operational principles that define the mechanisms through which a secular regime is 
built. Foundational principles answer to the question why a secular regime is needed at 
all; operational principles establish how it can be realized in practice.12 To start with the 
foundational principles, Maclure and Taylor argue that a secular regime is warranted 
because, to maintain its legitimacy, a liberal state (1) needs to treat its citizens with 
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equal respect and (2) grant them freedom of conscience. Under conditions of plurality, 
citizens hold a variety of religious and non-religious worldviews, which are equally 
reasonable. Thus, the state must not favor one group of citizens over the others, by 
identifying itself with a specific worldview. Respect for the equal dignity of all human 
beings therefore grounds the state’s neutrality towards all citizens. The other 
foundational principle of a secular regime derives from the need to protect freedom of 
conscience. The state ought to ensure that all citizens are unrestricted to express their 
own religious and non-religious worldviews in an autonomous manner. It has no right to 
paternalistically decide for the citizens what is good for them. Treating citizens with 
equal respect and granting them freedom of conscience are foundational principles that 
guide all secular regimes. As such, we might call them first-order, or intrinsic norms 
that must not be violated under any circumstances, lest the state forfeits its liberal 
credentials. 
The operational principles are derived from the foundational ones. As second-order 
principles they are mainly concerned with the institutional realization of the first-order 
principles. Maclure and Taylor maintain that the “separation of church and state and the 
neutrality of the state toward religions and toward secular philosophical movements” 
(2011:23) make political secularism work. These two principles hence provide the 
means to the ends of treating citizens with equal respect and of granting them freedom 
of conscience. Maclure and Taylor read the separation of church and state very broadly. 
“Separation” simply means that a line ought to be drawn between the religious and the 
political system. This drawing of a line, then, allows for forms of association between 
the two systems. Indeed, the authors insist that even states with weakly established 
national churches, such as the United Kingdom or Denmark, would count as secular 
regimes so long as they adhere to the foundational principles enumerated above. 
The chief point in this normative analysis is that the second-order principles to establish 
secular regimes can be realized in many different ways. While the foundational 
principles apply in all liberal states, the operational principles are open to many 
variations. What is more, Maclure and Taylor underline that the normative core of 
political secularism makes conflicts more or less unavoidable. Since there is not only 
one principle underlying secular regimes, but rather two, it is inevitable that they will 
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sometimes clash. Such clashes are far from being exceptional, given that freedom of 
conscience can be reasonably interpreted more or less extensively. The question is, of 
course, how this clash will be concretely handled by the state. To draw on an example 
that Maclure and Taylor invoke as well (2011:24): the controversy around the public 
display of religious belonging in school illustrates that the foundational principles of 
secularism are not in full harmony. Simply put, it cannot be a priori decided whether 
wearing the headscarf infringes on the state’s neutrality or whether it is simply a symbol 
whose exhibition must be protected by the principle of freedom of conscience. The 
various headscarf affairs in several European countries attest to the fact that secular 
regimes choose different routes to balance these claims. (Saharso 2007) 
What, then, are the main models of secular regimes we can isolate according to this 
hierarchy of principles? Maclure and Taylor argue that the operational principles, 
governing the separation of church and state and the state’s neutrality, may be 
interpreted in a rigid (“republican”) or an open (“liberal-pluralistic”) manner. (Maclure 
and Taylor 2011:27–35) This means that the relationship between intrinsic first-order 
and derivative second order principles can be crafted through more or less strict 
connections. Rigidly secular regimes will be strict in their interpretation of the 
separation of church and state and the state’s neutrality, often aiming for civic 
integration through the exclusion of religion the public sphere. Openly secular regimes 
will interpret the operational principles as mainly serving the end of the foundational 
principles, thereby endorsing the flexible negotiation of both the separation of church 
and state and the state’s neutrality. 
Drawing on, and adapting the findings of a recent article (Farha 2012), I would now like 
to propose a tripartite taxonomy to organize the ideal-typical responses of secular 
regimes to religious pluralism: coercive, segregationist and accommodative. This 
taxonomy builds on the reflections by Maclure and Taylor, but fleshes them out in terms 
of models that correspond more closely to real-world cases. After setting up this 
taxonomy a few clarifications and caveats will be added. 
(1) Coercive secular regimes interpret both the separation of church and state and the 
state’s neutrality very rigidly. In fact, they regularly go beyond a hands-off approach to 
religious pluralism and aim at emancipating citizens from the “yoke” of religion. While 
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acknowledging freedom of expression as a basic right, they often perceive belonging in 
religious organizations as either atavistic or as dangerous to the democratic polity. In 
both cases, the state’s response is one of coercion: the individual is forced to relinquish 
its ties with religion when entering the public sphere, and religious organizations do not 
receive any kind of support from the state. One of the main characteristics of this type 
of secular regime is that it seeks to establish and fortify a well-guarded border between 
private and public spheres. Accordingly, coercive secular regimes endorse the 
privatization of religion and distrust any display of religious belonging in the public 
sphere.  
Their history is often riveted by long-drawn battles between the state and church. 
Coercive secular regimes have emerged from fierce antagonism, their profile sharpened 
while combatting with religious organizations. Out of these struggles, the central 
allegiance of coercive secular regimes emerged: an allegiance to the cause of the 
common good, which remains protected by the “civil religion” of the republic. The 
coercive character of such a state comes to the fore when citizens seek to interpret their 
freedom of conscience as extending into the public sphere. The best-known examples of 
this category are modern-day France (Baubérot 2003, 2008, 2009, 2010; Gauchet 1998) 
and Turkey (Azak 2010; Çaǧaptay 2006; Cinar 2005; Göle 1997). Both countries qua 
secular regimes have been described as oriented towards aggressively emancipating the 
citizenry from religious communities and allegiances; both seek to guard the border 
between public and private through laws and policies. And not only the French, but also 
the Turkish public goes through cycles of vehement contestation as regards the their 
republican heritage. 
(2) Segregationist secular regimes typically move away from a strict interpretation of 
secularism’s operational principles. Thus, they make room for a more flexible 
negotiation of the separation of church and state and the state’s neutrality. 
Segregationist secular regimes do not force citizens to overcome their religion. Rather, 
they accept religion as part and parcel of public life in deeply divided societies. Their 
history is often characterized by long periods of cohabitation between different cultural 
and religious communities. None of these communities is, in these societies, strong 
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enough to establish an overwhelming majority that would allow it to fully dominate the 
other cultural and religious communities. 
Two examples for this kind of secular regime are to be found in The Netherlands (until 
the 1960s) and contemporary Lebanon. The Dutch system of “pillarization” (Andeweg 
and Irwin 2005:19–44) and the Lebanese system of sectarianism (Haddad 2009; Rabil 
2011) best epitomize the governance model of “consociationalism”. This model has 
been developed to explain the functional structure of societies deeply divided by 
religious and cultural identities (Lijphart 1969, 2008). With regard to the operational 
principles of secularism, the segregationist secular state clearly rejects a strict 
interpretation; rather it attempts to attribute to all cultural and religious communities an 
equal share in governmental institutions and in the public sphere. 
(3) Accommodative secular regimes adopt yet another strategy to deal with religious 
pluralism. Their goal is to replace the hands-off approach of the state, as we can detect it 
in the republican model of governance, with an even-handed one. This means that the 
state’s role in accommodative secular regimes is to provide citizens with equal 
opportunities to exercise their religious freedom. This role requires from the state 
flexibility in managing the claims of individuals asking for exemptions from generally 
binding rules. In the literature, this flexibility on the part of public institutions is called 
“reasonable accommodation”, a term that has its origins in labor law regulating the anti-
discrimination of disabled people. Reasonable accommodation aims at ensuring that all 
individuals – no matter whether they are members of a majority or minority group – are 
given the same opportunities in society. Concretely, this implies an (legal) obligation on 
behalf of public institutions to accommodate the claims of cultural and religious 
minorities. The duty to accommodate is grounded in the observation that the state itself 
cannot be as “purely” neutral as republican theorists suggest. This, indirect 
discrimination is a common phenomenon acknowledged by accommodative secular 
regimes. 
Among the many examples for such acts of accommodation, consider the culturally 
coded distribution of public holidays. (Maclure and Taylor 2011:68) In many European 
countries, there are still laws in place prohibiting businesses from opening on Sunday. 
These laws are derived from the Christian heritage of these societies. The same is true 
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for other major holidays, such as Christmas and New Year. Accommodative secular 
regimes take this obvious fact – that some norms simply cannot be culturally and 
religiously neutral – as the starting point for considering what needs to be done for those 
who are indirectly discriminated by a culturally and religiously biased norm, for 
instance by giving minority members the right to take the day off according to their 
religious prescriptions. Canada – the only country in the world that has officially 
recognized multiculturalism in its constitution (Tierney 2007) – is the paradigmatic 
example for such an accommodative secular regime. (Banting and Kymlicka 2010) 
Having identified these three ideal-types, a number of explanatory comments seem 
obligatory. The first comment concerns the occurrence of borderline cases and of 
intersections between mainstream cases. None of the three models of secularism 
described above covers all the characteristics of states in the real world. Here is just one 
example to underline this observation: Even republican France, which indubitably fits 
under the rubric of a coercive secular state, enacts policies that resemble the 
accommodative practices of multicultural states. The reasons for this are twofold. As 
Baubérot has shown (2010), France’s history is permeated by the conflict between 
clerical and anti-clerical forces. In France, the dual founding myths of the secular 
republic through the 1905 law of separation (Saunders 2009) and of the Catholic 
baptizing of the French chief Clovis in the 5th century CE prepared the ground for the 
ongoing contest between two narratives of civil religion. Furthermore, pragmatic 
solutions for an increasingly pluralistic civil society have in France become a practical 
necessity. A similar overlapping can be diagnosed between the segregationist and the 
accommodative models of secularism: the Dutch national model of citizenship, at least 
during its phase of pillarization, has been described as strongly favoring multicultural 
settings. (Saharso and Lettinga 2008) 
The second comment has to do with the comparative evaluation of the three models. 
The distinction between “coercive”, “segregationist” and “accommodative” types of 
secular regimes might at first sight indicate a normative hierarchy. While it is clear that 
the republican model of coercive secularism has sometimes exacerbated conflicts in 
civil society – as the ongoing headscarf affairs in France attest (Scott 2007) – it is 
equally evident that the other models run into problems as well. One of the most serious 
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challenges that all secular regimes in the West face today has to do with the negative 
and racist representation of Islam in much of the mainstream media. “Islamophobia”, it 
can reasonably be argued, is nowadays an already widespread, yet still growing 
phenomenon that has affected almost all Western societies; and multicultural states with 
an official policy of recognizing diversity, such as Canada, are unfortunately no 
exception to this rule. (Fekete 2009; Allen 2010) Thus, it would be dangerously 
premature to assume that the much-celebrated accommodative model, with its emphasis 
on reasonable accommodation, is immune to great injustices. (Helly 2011) 
The third and last point touches on the methodological discussion in section II. As I 
have suggested there, the three forms of relating contexts and norms are akin to “pre-
commitments” political philosophers take on board before investigating particular cases. 
Therefore, it is of course possible to engage with the proposed models of secularism in 
many, and sometimes conflicting ways: either the models are investigated in an 
idealizing, a reconstructive or a dialectical manner. This article has not strived to assess 
these “pre-commitments” according to their plausibility or usefulness for academic 
research. But it has hopefully shown that the diversity of approaches to political 
secularism is to a certain degree owed to the complexity of both the selected conceptual 
apparatus and the social reality under inquiry. 
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Notes 
                                                
1 I borrow the term “empty signifier” from Ernesto Laclau’s theory of radical 
democracy. Laclau claims that an “empty signifier” emerges from a “hegemonic 
operation (or the construction of a Master signifier in the Lacanian sense): a certain 
particularity transforms its own body in the representation of an incommensurable  
totality.” (Laclau 2006:107) 
2 Following such disputes, one might indeed be forgiven for associating them with 
Marx’ and Engels’ allegation, in the German Ideology, that the Young Hegelians are 
fighting “only against ‘phrases’. They forget, however, that they fight them only with 
phrases of their own. In no way are they attacking the actual existing world; they merely 
attack the phrases of the world.” (Marx and Engels 1994:106). I take this reference to 
the German Ideology from Mary Dietz’s excellent review of recent democratic theory. 
(Dietz 1998) 
3 I take this Freudian addition from Michael Warner’s Secularization and its 
Discontents, which tracks recent developments in the Sociology of Religion. (Warner 
2010) 
4 The division between these two camps is also hinted at in the introduction of a 
recently edited volume on secular regimes from a comparative perspective. (Cady and 
Hurd 2010:23) 
5 This is not to say that everybody agrees with Bhargava’s description of Indian 
secularism. For critical objections see: 
Balagangadhara and J. D. Roover 2007; J. De Roover and Balagangadhara 2008.  
6 For an excellent overview of the methodological concerns involved in this debate see: 
Bauböck 2008. 
7 The following taxonomy is partly inspired by Cécile Laborde’s methodological 
reflections on how to engage with the “Hijab affairs”. (Laborde 2008:4–6) I say “partly 
inspired” because I do not fully agree with Laborde’s skeptical dismissal of 
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“contextualist” modes of engagement. In my view, Laborde is in fact much closer to the 
analytic tradition she herself seems to reject. 
8 For the most elaborate philosophical defense of this position in general see G. A. 
Cohen’s multifaceted work. (Cohen 2008) 
9 Laborde (2008:5) indicates that Anna Elisabetta Galeotti’s work (2002) would provide 
an example for such an idealizing approach.  
10 Talal Asad’s genealogical writings epitomize this approach best. (Asad 2003) See 
also his paper on the headscarf affairs. (Asad 2006) For another example of this 
approach see: Mahmood 2006. 
11 Joseph Carens’s plea for a contextualist political theory is emblematic of this 
approach. (Carens 2000, 2004) Also, Amartya Sen’s latest book promoting a 
comparative approach to justice might fit into this category. (Sen 2009) 
12 In the next paragraphs, I paraphrase Maclure’s and Taylor’s distinction between 
foundational and operational principles. This distinction has also formed the theoretical 
basis for the Bouchard/Taylor report in Québec. (Bouchard and Taylor 2008) 
